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Institutional Sources of 
Change in the Formal 
Structure of Organiza-
tions: The Diffusion of 
Civil Service Reform, 
1880-1935 
Pamela S. Tolbert and 
Lynne G. Zucker 
This paper investigates the diffusion and institutionaliza-
tion of change in formal organization structure, using data 
on the adoption of civil service reform by cities. It is shown 
that when civil service procedures are required by the state, 
they diffuse rapidly and directly from the state to each city. 
When the procedures are not so legitimated, they diffuse 
gradually and the underlying sources of adoption change 
overtime. In the latter case, early adoption of civil service by 
cities is related to internal organizational requirements, with 
city characteristics predicting adoption, while late adoption 
is related to institutional definitions of legitimate structural 
form, so that city characteristics no longer predict the 
adoption decision. Overall, the findings provide strong 
support for the argument that the adoption of a policy or 
program by an organization is importantly determined by 
the extent to which the measure is institutionalized — 
whether by law or by gradual legitimation.* 
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Explanations of formal structure in organizations are as diver-
gent as the current approaches to organization theory. Two 
approaches in particular have generated strong debate: one 
views organizations as rational actors, albeit in a complex 
environment (Thompson, 1967; Blau and Schoenherr, 1971), 
while the other views organizations as captives of the institu-
tional environment in which they exist (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Zucker, 1982, 1983). Both approaches have important 
implications for the processes underlying diffusion of an inno-
vation in the formal structure of organizations, the first pointing 
to the need for effectiveness or efficiency that may follow 
adoption, the latter pointing to the need for legitimacy of the 
organization in the wider social structure. Though these two 
approaches are not necessarily incompatible, since organiza-
tions may adopt innovations for different reasons, they are 
seldom both investigated in the same empirical study. 
Here, one important point of convergence is explored by using 
both perspectives to explain the adoption of civil service 
procedures by municipal governments from 1880 to 1935. 
Adoption of formal structure can be investigated in diverse 
organizational contexts; here we examine the process in cities, 
often used as the context for such research (e.g., Schnore and 
Alford, 1963; Knoke, 1982). Early adoption of civil service 
reform — before 1915 — appears to reflect efforts to resolve 
specific problems confronting municipal administrations, while 
later adoption is rooted instead in the growing legitimacy of civil 
service procedures, with the diffusion of societal norms serving 
to define local structure (Parsons, 1951). We first turn to a brief 
history of civil service reform, leading to a discussion of the 
institutionalization of reform. We then examine basic assump-
tions in the organization literature about the sources of change 
in formal structure to establish the basis for the analysis of 
adoption patterns of civil service procedures. 
HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL CIVIL SERVICE 
Civil service reform represents one of the earliest attempts to 
"rationalize" local administration by instituting a system of 
written examinations for municipal appointees and by insulating 
administrative personnel from political influence through ten-
ure (White, 1949; Griffith, 1974). This entailed legally invest-
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ing responsibility for personnel appointments in a central 
agency or commission. For the most part, civil service proce-
dures were not required by law or other regulation from the 
wider environment. The only piece of national civil service 
legislation during this period, the Pendleton Act of 1882, dealt 
exclusively with federal government organizations and did not 
mention local or state government (Thelen, 1972). It was also a 
relatively "weak law that effectively allowed each administra-
tion to classify public offices as it chose" (Wiebe, 1967: 61). 
Only three states — New York, Massachusetts, and Ohio — 
adopted statewide measures for civil service reform during the 
time period considered here. Most city governments were not 
required to adopt civil service reform because they were 
relatively autonomous of higher level organizations, state or 
federal (Griffith, 1974; Gelfand, 1975). 
Why, then, didcitiesadoptcivilserviceprocedures? Depending 
on the particular historian consulted, there are a number of 
different answers to this question. The most common answer 
identifies both the rampant corruption in the political machines 
common during this period and dissatisfaction with govern-
mental performance, especially in service delivery (Wiebe, 
1967: 4-5): "Corrupt bargains, crude force, and extralegal 
expedients had become the new standard.... The inability of 
city government to provide even minimum services.. .added its 
measure to the chaos." Other historians have stressed the role 
of political cleavage, in which dominant social groups main-
tained, or won, their position (Hays, 1964; Weinstein, 1968). In 
some cases, civil service reform provided the basis on which 
these groups could reassert their dominance over immigrant-
run machines (Hofstadter, 1956; Wolfingerand Field, 1966). 
With growth of the Progressive Movement, and its emphasis 
on scientific management (Griffith, 1974: 15), came a basis for 
government reform. Basically, the reform movement at-
tempted to change the conception of the city from that of a 
political body to that of a business corporation, with the city "a 
joint stock affair in which the taxpayers are the stockholders" 
(Clinton, 1886; Crandon, 1886-1887: 524). Reformers engaged 
in a series of highly publicized struggles to promote municipal 
reforms in almost every major city (Wiebe, 1967: 168). The first 
city passed legislation requiring civil service in 1884; by 1935, 
over 450 cities across the United States had enacted some type 
of civil service legislation (Van Riper, 1951). Thus, by 1935 the 
transformation of city government from a politically based 
system to a bureaucratically based system was well underway 
(Hays, 1972: 9). 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF REFORM 
Civil service reform thus took place during a period of general 
ferment over the role and shape of government organizations. 
Some of the reforms proposed during this period were adopted 
by very few governments; other reforms, such as the commis-
sion form of government, were widely adopted but were rapidly 
eclipsed by new innovations. Such reforms are more typical of 
those previously investigated in diffusion studies; these tradi-
tional explanations rest largely on investigation of innovations 
that failed to be institutionalized. Two principal characteristics 
that indicate the relatively high degree of institutionalization of 
civil service reform set it apart from the other reforms proposed 
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and implemented during this period: (1) its most rapid spread 
occurred after the initial ferment subsided, indicating that it was 
taken for granted, and (2) it is the most permanent and 
widespread of all reforms accomplished during this period. 
Both of these characteristics are independent of the major 
dependent variable, adoption, which we used in our analysis. 
Turning to the first point, the most acrimonious debates over 
civil service procedures occurred before 1900; after 1910 the 
procedures were generally discussed without much conflict, 
and by 1920 civil service procedures were accepted as the 
properwaytoconductcitybusiness(Schiesl, 1977: 187).Table 
1 summarizes data coded from the major publication of the 
National Municipal League, a federation of local organizations 
active in the promotion of civil service reform. A content 
analysis of the proceedings of the League's annual meeting and 
of papers delivered at each meeting was carried out for five 
years -1894,1900,1905,1909, and 1915. These records were 
coded in two ways. First, the total number of times a topic 
related to civil service reform was mentioned was counted in 
each yearly report. Such mentions were divided into two 
categories: criticisms of existing arrangements (e.g., refer-
ences to spoils, machines, or political patronage), and proce-
dures forimplementing the reform (e.g., merit systems, promo-
tion systems, and performance evaluation). Second, the total 
amount of space devoted to discussing any of the topics was 
measured, yielding a summary number of pages for each year. 
In order to control for the length of each report, which varied 
considerably from year to year, each summary measure was 
divided by the total number of pages in the report for that year. 
Table 1 
Content Analysis of Civil Service Discussion over Time, 1894-1915* 
Stimulus for 
Publication reformt 
date 
1894 
1900 
1905 
1909 
1915 
Mean (S.D.) 
5.77 (1.08) 
9.87 (2.99) 
2.60 (1.45) 
2.07 (0.67) 
.20 (0.17) 
Implementation* 
Mean (S.D.) 
1.43 (2.23) 
3.87 (1.70) 
2.77 (2.80) 
1.97 (2.00) 
.60 (0.60) 
Space devoted to 
civil service reform 
.041 
.060 
.020 
.016 
.018 
•See Appendix for sources. All data taken as a proportion of the total number of 
pages. 
tCoded as mentions of spoils system, patronage, machine politics. 
• Coded as 
t ion. 
i mentions of merit system, promotion system , performance evalua-
Exhortations concerning the evils of the former governmental 
systems, providing the stimulus for reform, showed a dramatic 
decrease between 1900 and 1905. Discussion of the more 
technical aspects of implementation (merit systems, promo-
tion, and performance evaluation) followed a similar pattern, 
though neither the rise from 1894 to 1900 nor the decline from 
1900 to 1905 was as sharp. The proportion of pages devoted to 
general discussion of civil service reform showed a similar, 
though less marked, decline after 1900. These data indicate, 
then, that direct agitation for civil service adoption peaked in 
1900 and declined considerably thereafter. Since the rapid rise 
24/ASQ, March 1983 
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in adoption occurred after 1915, it appears to have occurred in 
the context of the recognized need for new procedures, rather 
than as a result of extensive direct pressure (or of regional 
diffusion, which had only a weak effect).1 In general, then, the 
reduction in the amount of debate and discussion of the 
stimulus and implementation of the reforms in the League's 
proceedings indicates that the reforms had increasing legiti-
macy and were more taken for granted. 
Turning now to the question of permanence, regardless of 
whether the procedures were transmitted through state regu-
lation or gradual adoption by municipal governments, civil 
service reform caused changes in city government organization 
that became enduring elements of structure. Cities seldom 
discarded civil service once it was adopted, and federal and 
state legislation after 1935 increasingly required the use of local 
civil service procedures. The rapid institutionalization of the 
reform rested on the assumed isomorphism between it and the 
ideal rational bureaucratic form (Zucker, 1983). Government 
organizations, increasingly oriented to service delivery, were 
modeled after the business corporation, where personnel 
selection and promotion were presumably based on merit, not 
familial or other personal ties. Other municipal reforms pro-
moted during this period, such as the city manager form of 
government, nonpartisan ballots, and city-wide elections, also 
reflected the drive to "rationalize" municipal administration. 
A hundred years after their initial introduction, civil service 
structure and procedures are nearly universal. Hence, one of 
the key defining elements of institutions — "establishment of 
relative permanence of a distinctly social sort" (Hughes, 1936: 
180) — is present in the case of the civil service. Local 
government structure became clearly patterned by the wider 
culture over time; civil service procedures became ubiquitous. 
Of course, not all variables related to adop-
tion can be explored here. We focus on 
those identified by historians of this period 
as most significant. Unlike most other 
studies of reform processes (e.g., Knoke, 
1982), regional differences were nonsig-
nificant except in the case of the South 
which, as expected from prior research, 
lagged behind the other regions. Tables 
showing this data are available from 
Pamela S. Tolbert. Although the southern 
states were tardy in adopting civil service 
reform, excluding them from the analysis 
below had virtually no impact on the re-
sults; they were therefore included. 
CHANGE IN THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Institutionalization refers to the process through which com-
ponents of formal structure become widely accepted, as both 
appropriate and necessary, and serve to legitimate organiza-
tions. Most fundamentally, the process is one of social change. 
This process may occur in different ways (Hemes, 1976): (1) 
initial endogenous change may take place when the process is 
gradual and not required and/or (2) exogenous change may take 
place later in the process or when the process is required. That 
the different processes of change are not incompatible can be 
seen in their mutual influences over the course of civil service 
reform. Before examining this in more detail, some general 
perspectives on sources of organizational structure need to be 
considered. 
For the most part, organizational theorists have analyzed formal 
structure as if it were static, focusing on its sources at one point 
in time. Radically different views of these sources have 
emerged. In one view, formal structure arises from internal 
sources, either directly (Scott, 1975) through problems of 
coordination and control (e.g., Anderson and Warkov, 1961; 
Woodward, 1965; Blau, 1970) or indirectly (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 
1976) through power, leadership, and socialization to specific 
organizational roles, often mediating environmental effects 
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(e.g., Child, 1972; Thornton and Nardi, 1975; Pfefferand 
Salancik, 1978). From the other viewpoint, formal structure 
arises from external sources, from the direct effects of the 
institutional environment. In order to survive, organizations 
conform to what is societally defined as appropriate and 
efficient, largely disregarding the actual impact on organiza-
tional performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 353; Zucker, 
1982). 
These perspectives are not incompatible, but rather point to 
conditions under which changes in the formal structure of 
organizations will derive from internal or institutional sources. 
Before changes in formal structure become societally legiti-
mated and/or required, they are adopted— much as is any other 
innovation — through a process of diffusion depending in large 
part on the value of the changes for the internal functioning of 
the organization (Utterback, 1971; Aldrich, 1979). It is not 
always easy to assess this, of course, especially when the 
outputs of the organization are difficult to evaluate. Under these 
conditions, the need for changes will often be determined by 
the lack of consensus, or degree of conflict, within the organi-
zation (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Olsen, 1976; Pfef-
fer, 1981). Fundamentally, existing structure comes to be 
viewed as problematic, and the "logic of good fa i th" (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977) is disrupted. Therefore, to the extent that an 
organization is an early adopter of an innovation in formal 
structure, its decision to adopt will depend on the degree to 
which the change improves internal process (for example, by 
streamlining procedures or reducing conflict). 
In contrast, once historical continuity has established their 
importance (Bergerand Luckmann, 1967; Zucker, 1977), 
changes in formal structure are adopted because of their 
societal legitimacy, regardless of their value for the internal 
functioning of the organization. When some organizational 
elements become institutionalized, that is, when they are 
widely understood to be appropriate and necessary compo-
nents of efficient, rational organizations, organizations are 
under considerable pressure to incorporate these elements into 
their formal structure in order to maintain their legitimacy. By 
doing so, "an organization demonstrates that it is acting on 
collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner" 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 319). This may be necessary to 
ensure access to various resources that the organization needs 
for survival (in the case of cities, favorable bond ratings, 
membership in some national organizations, state or federal 
funding, etc.). It is assumed that the adoption of an innovative 
measure may have little or no effect on the actual efficiency of 
organizational operations; its adoption fulfills symbolic rather 
than task-related requirements. Hence, to the extent that an 
organization is a late adopter of an innovation in formal struc-
ture, its decision to adopt will depend on the degree to which 
there is a common understanding that the change is necessary 
for efficient organizational performance (Walker, 1969). 
Two basic problems are confronted here: What is the effect of 
explicit hierarchical legitimation of a reform, and what is the 
effect of rapid and widespread legitimation of a reform on its 
subsequent adoption? The first analysis compares the effect of 
hierarchical control by the state wi th the effect of nonman-
dated spread of reform on the rate of adoption. In the second 
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Work to date on the adoption process has 
been largely descriptive, providing few pre-
dictions that generalize beyond a particular 
case. In this paper we do not attempt to 
construct an explanation for all types of 
adoption processes but to specify a particu-
lar class of adoption situations to which our 
generalizations are expected to apply. 
There are a number of important relations 
that we do not consider here. First, differ-
ent modes of gradual adoption are not 
considered. The innovation may produce a 
striking increase in effectiveness or effi-
ciency and be rapidly adopted on "rational" 
grounds, or as in the case of a technological 
innovation, the value may be assessed as 
superior and the innovation may be rapidly 
adopted simply on the basis of professional 
opinion. Second, we do not explore sources 
of resistance. Some adoptions, even when 
supported by professional opinion, meet 
with much more resistance than others 
(e.g., computerized accounting systems in 
small businesses or fluoridation of city 
water supplies). Finally, we explore only a 
limited set of factors that may lead to 
adoption, though we have focused on 
those identified by historians as most 
significant. 
analysis, changes in the ability to predict adoption on the basis 
of particular organizational characteristics from the early 
periods to the later periods are explored in detail. It is expected 
that when innovations are rapidly institutionalized, early adop-
tion can rest on either the force of the hierarchical structure 
that requires the reform or on particular characteristics that 
make it appropriate to adopt the reform; however, while 
particular characteristics may predict early adoption, they lose 
their explanatory power rapidly.2 In contrast, if the adoption fails 
to become legitimated, the same characteristics that predict 
early adoption continue to predict which units are more likely to 
adopt throughout the time period (Hamblin, Jacobsen, and 
Miller, 1973: Ch. 7). In such cases, regional effects and 
particular sets of characteristics, such as high status, that 
identify a set of "innovators" emerge as central predictors of 
adoption (Rogers, 1962). 
LAW AND HIERARCHICAL LEGITIMATION 
In organizational networks in which the control of resources and 
authority is centralized in a few powerful organizations, the 
institutionalization of an element of formal structure is largely 
dependent on its legitimation by those organizations (Benson, 
1975). Once legitimated by higher level organizations, through 
legal mandate or other formal means, dependent organizations 
generally respond by rapidly incorporating the element into their 
formal structure. This adoption is seldom problematic when the 
elements have high face validity and there is common agree-
ment concerning their overall utility. However, under certain 
conditions, strong resistance can develop. For example, lack of 
consensus on the value of an innovation, such as curriculum 
reform in public schools (Rowan, 1982), can lead to failure to 
adopt or to early rejection of the innovation. In addition, strong 
coalitions or interest groups can block a hierarchically mandated 
change, as happened with busing to integrate schools. 
We do not explore the conditions underlying such resistance; it 
is important simply to note that legal requirements do not 
always ensure adoption. In the case of civil service, states, such 
as Wisconsin, with strong interest groups that opposed adop-
tion failed to pass statewide measures. However, in states 
where there was little organized opposition, and consensus 
concerning the potential value of the innovation was high, the 
speed and pattern of diffusion among cities under state man-
date are expected to reflect the degree of hierarchical legitima-
tion; diffusion will occur from the state to each city, ratherthan 
among cities. When states pass laws requiring municipal civil 
service, it is expected that there will be a landslide effect in the 
first year of implementation of the law, with the state influenc-
ing the remaining cities to adopt in subsequent years. These 
effects should be apparent in the three states adopting such 
laws during the time period investigated here. 
Sample 
Adoption was defined as the passage of any legal requirement 
for the institution of civil service procedures. In most cases, civil 
service requirements affected only parts of city government; 
fire and police departments were frequently the first affected. 
Data on adoption of civil service procedures, 1880 to 1935, were 
collected for 167 cities. Of these 167 cities, 74 are located in the 
three states that adopted civil service reform requirements for all 
27/ASQ, March 1983 
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cities prior to 1930 and 93 are in states that had no such 
requirement. 
Statewide laws requiring municipal civil service were passed by 
New York in 1883 and by Massachusetts in 1884. Ohio made 
civil service mandatory for fire and police departments under its 
municipal code in 1902; this code was extended in 1908, and in 
1912 municipal civil service was given constitutional status 
(Griffith, 1974). In the analysis of the three states mandating 
civil service, the 74 cities having a population of 50,000 or 
greater in 1930 were included. Data were aggregated for the 
three states requiring adoption both because of the small 
sample size and because initial analyses indicated no significant 
differences in the patterns of adoption between states. 
The 93 cities located in states that did not mandate civil service 
were drawn from a sample of 150 cities randomly selected from 
a sampling frame of all cities having a population over 25,000 in 
1930, stratified by size. The cities were selected from the 150 
by using two criteria: (1) cities of less than 50,000 were 
excluded, because data on smaller cities proved extremely 
scanty, particularly in the earlierdecades, and (2) cities in states 
mandating civil service were excluded. 
The data sources for all the analyses reported in this paper are 
listed in the Appendix. Charles N. Halaby and M. Craig Brown 
initially conceived of a longitudinal quantitative study of the 
adoption of civil service systems by American city govern-
ments. The Civil Service Reform League reports that make 
such a study possible were brought to our attention in 1977 by 
them. 
Findings 
In the Figure, which plots the actual time of adoption of civil 
service procedures, 1880 to 1930, we can compare the differ-
ences in the rate of adoption of civil service reforms between 
cities in states that required it and those that had no require-
ments. When adoption was required by the state, the rate of 
adoption was rapid. Within the first ten years, over 60 percent 
of all cities adopted civil service procedures; then the rate 
slowed, but all cities have adopted within 37 years. In sharp 
contrast, cities with no such requirement initially adopted much 
more gradually. In the first fifteen years the rate of adoption 
was low. After this period, however, the rate of adoption 
progressively accelerated over time. At the end of the time 
period considered here, a little over 60 percent of these cities 
had adopted civil service procedures, their rate of adoption 
about equal to that reached after ten years by cities required to 
adopt. 
There is also some evidence that the underlying process of 
adoption is different for these two groups of cities. Two 
models, incorporating different assumptions about the sources 
of diffusion, were estimated for both groups of cities (Coleman, 
1964: 495-505). Both models were operationalized using al-
gorithms developed inZucker(1975). Cities that adopted civil 
service procedures when no statewide requirement existed can 
be treated as sets of small separate groups, with full communi-
cation between some but no communication between others. 
Using a diffusion model of decentralized influence, the overall 
fit was acceptable, though the estimated values diverged from 
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the actual values in both the initial adoption period (overesti-
mated) and the adoption after 1912 (underestimated). In con-
trast, in those cities that adopted civil service procedures when 
the state required it, diffusion from the source was almost 
immediate, so that adoption by cities in the first year does not fit 
a diffusion model, even one that assumes centralized influence. 
In our case, over a third of the sample adopted procedures in 
that first year, creating a landslide rather than a diffusion effect. 
However, the remaining years showed a pattern of single 
source diffusion that yielded a close fit between the actual and 
estimated values. Hence, as these results demonstrate, two 
fundamentally different patterns of adoption, resting on differ-
ent processes, occurred as cities adopted civil service 
procedures.3 
GRADUAL ADOPTION PROCESS 
We argue that, when not mandated by state government, civil 
service was adopted at first in response to conflict generated by 
different conceptions of the appropriate role and function of 
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municipal government held by older, established groups and/or 
community business leaders, and those held by lower status 
groups in the community, particularly the politically organized 
immigrants. In line wi th work by historians on civil service 
adoption and by students of municipal structure, we expect 
early adopters of civil service reform to have a relatively larger 
foreign-born population, more middle class members (smaller 
proportion of manufacturing wage earners and illiterates), and a 
narrow scope of administration (lower municipal expenditures). 
It is also expected that they will tend to be larger and younger 
than nonadopters, although the overall effects of age and size 
are somewhat unclear since they are apt to be inversely related 
to adoption. These variables are discussed in more detail below. 
Our prediction, in contrast to the earlier research, is that while 
these variables are important determinants of the adoption of 
an innovation early in the process of its diffusion, they become 
relatively poorer predictors as the reform measure becomes 
more institutionalized. Overt ime, adoption is expected to 
become independent of internal factors, as external definitions 
of modern municipal administration become more significant. 
In line wi th earlier empirical work on institutionalization (Zucker, 
1977), it is expected that as a reform measure is increasingly 
taken for granted because of social legitimation, cities will begin 
to adopt it as a "social fact," regardless of any particular city 
characteristics. Hence, the ability of these city variables, taken 
as a whole, to differentiate between adopters and nonadopters 
should progressively decline. It is also possible that the effec-
tiveness of a particular variable may change, such that it 
becomes a relatively better or poorer predictor at different 
points in t ime; our primary concern here, however, lies not in 
tracing the effects of specific city characteristics on adoption, 
but in assessing the effects of overall differences between 
adopters and nonadopters over time. 
We do not assume that a particular set of characteristics is 
always or usually related to adoption of innovation, but rather 
that those characteristics that make it more "rational" to adopt 
will be important early in the diffusion process. This may explain 
why no consistent set of characteristics predisposing individu-
als or organizations to adopt innovations have been discovered, 
despite considerable research aimed specifically at characteris-
tics as explanatory variables (Downs and Mohr, 1976). Each 
specific innovation should be related to a set of adopter 
characteristics, only some of which will overlap wi th other 
innovations unless they are linked to a common justification. 
City Characteristics and Reform: Measures 
Before turning to the analysis, the characteristics that have 
previously been identified as predictors of adoption of civil 
service reform need to be more fully discussed. While civil 
service reform was promoted by the Progressive Movement as 
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the administra-
tion of local government (Woodruff, 1903; Thelen, 1972), some 
historians have argued that civil service reform was used as a 
political weapon by social groups (the industrialists or the 
middle class) to gain or maintain their political dominance (e.g., 
allowing them to define administrative positions in such a way 
as to virtually ensure the appointment of the group's members 
to municipal office). 
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To reduce problems of multicollinearity, 
both the number of manufacturing wage 
earners and municipal expenditures (dis-
cussed under "Scope") were linearly re-
gressed on the log of city size (Maddala, 
1977). 
S 
Liebert's (1976: 33) research indicates that 
this measure is strongly correlated with the 
number of functions performed by munici-
pal governments (r = .72). 
Immigrants and reform. Local reform efforts have often been 
viewed as a response to the growth of machine politics 
associated wi th the tremendous influx of immigrants into 
American cities during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries (Hofstadter, 1956; Wolf ingerand Field, 1966). Since 
civil service reform eliminated political patronage, it repre-
sented a particularly effective way for the traditional Anglo-
American elites to attack immigrant-dominated machines by: 
(1) establishing criteria for appointment to office, including 
standards of education or literacy that were difficult for immi-
grants to meet, and (2) establishing rules governing tenure, to 
protect appointees from patronage-induced turnover in city 
government (Hays, 1964; Gordon, 1968). According to this 
argument, reform would be most common among cities wi th 
large foreign-born populations, where tensions between older 
Anglo-American groups and newly arrived immigrants would be 
highest. This is measured here as the percentage of the 
population that is foreign-born. 
Socioeconomic bases of reform. Receptivity to municipal 
reform has also been linked to the socioeconomic composition 
of a city, wi th the supporters of reform coming from the 
educated and professionalized middle class. Two different 
interpretations both suggest that municipal reform received its 
most enthusiastic support in cities with a large proportion of 
educated, white-collar citizens. On the one hand, the basic 
values of the newly emerging middle class — efficiency, 
impartiality, rationality — were most consistent wi th those 
underlying reform (Wiebe, 1967); on the other hand, however, 
middle class reformers were motivated by pragmatic concerns 
of securing representation of their political and economic 
interests in local government (Hays, 1964; Weinstein, 1968). 
The socioeconomic composition of a city was measured in two 
ways: the percentage of illiterates was used as a measure of 
the level of education in a city, and the number of manufactur-
ing wage earners (residualized on city size)4 was used as a rough 
index of the concentration of members in blue-collar occupa-
tions. Both were expected to be inversely related to the 
adoption of civil service reform. 
Scope. A third factor that has been suggested to have affected 
the adoption of reform is scope, or the number of functions 
performed by local government (Liebert, 1976; Turk, 1977). 
According to this argument, cities wi th broader scopes encour-
aged the development of competing special interests and 
higher levels of political activity by offering greater opportunity 
for political influence. These cities tended to have higher 
resistance to reform, because reform measures frequently 
limited accessibility to formal leadership positions. In contrast, 
cities in which "narrow scope presumably limited the relevance 
of the government and of its leaders hip vis-a-vis many types of 
possible interests" had higher rates of reform (Liebert, 1976: 
97). Total municipal expenditures (residualized on city size) were 
used as an indicator of governmental scope;5 this variable was 
expected to be inversely related to the adoption of civil service 
reform. 
Age. Another possible determinant of the adoption of reform is 
city age. According to Stinchcombe (1965) and several recent 
empirical studies (Kimberly, 1975; Liebert, 1976; Meyer and 
Brown, 1977), the formal structure of an organization tends to 
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reflect the historical era in which it originated, since organiza-
tions generally adopt and retain the form that was predominant 
at that time. By this reasoning, it would be expected that 
younger cities, those that were just beginning to develop when 
the municipal reform movement swept the country, would be 
more likely to adopt reforms than older cities whose municipal 
structures were already well entrenched and often supported 
by vested interests (see Williamson and Swanson, 1966, on age 
of city and adoption of industrial innovations). Age was mea-
sured as the year in which a city became incorporated; age 
therefore remains the same for each city throughout all the 
time periods. Given this measurement, age is expected to be 
positively related to adoption of civil service reform. 
Size. A final factor that has also been linked to the adoption of 
municipal reform is city size. Although studies of different 
types of reform measures have found size to have a varying 
impact on adoption (e.g., Kessel, 1962; Schnore and Alford, 
1963), studies that have specifically examined civil service 
reform have found a simple positive relationship between the 
adoption of the reform and city size (cf., Wolfinger and Field, 
1966). City size was logged to normalize its distribution. 
Data and Analysis 
The effect of these variables on cities' adoption of civil service 
measures was analyzed using a proportional hazards regression 
model (Cox, 1972). First developed in the biological sciences, 
models of this type have been adopted by social scientists to 
explore a variety of phenomena (cf., Hannan, Tuma, and 
Groeneveld, 1978; DiPrete, 1981; Carroll and Delacroix, 1982). 
A central advantage of these models over other cross-sectional 
approaches, such as logit or probit, is the explicit incorporation 
of the timing of changes in a qualitative dependent variable 
(Carroll, 1982). Essentially, the objective is to model the instan-
taneous transition rate, or the transition probability of moving 
from one discrete state to another over an infinitesimally small 
unit of time. Thus, the transition rate between state/ and state 
k, where p is the probability of such a transition, is defined as 
At-»0 At 
This hazard rate may depend both on time and on a set of 
exogenous variables. 
Here we use partial likelihood estimation procedures, based on 
work by Cox (1972). This approach requires less information for 
estimation and makes weaker parametric assumption than full 
likelihood methods. With partial likelihood, the likelihood func-
tion has two components, one that rests on the order of events 
and another that rests on the exact timing of the events. 
Maximization of the likelihood function is based only on the first 
component; thus, correct ordering of the events is required. 
Estimators obtained wi th this procedure, like full likeli hood 
estimators, have excellent asymptotic properties (Tuma, 1980). 
The general form of the model is 
hllt(t\X) = h0{t)exp(pX) 
or 
•\n{hik(t\X)lh0(t)}=pX, 
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where h(t) is the hazard function, or the rate of leaving a 
particular state among a set of units, in this case, moving from 
nonadoption of reform (0) to adoption (1). X is a vector of 
covariates, (3 is a vector of regression coefficients and h0(t) is a 
hazard function for a unit with X = 0 (Hopkins, 1981). 
Data. The data sources for adoption have already been dis-
cussed and are fully presented in the Appendix. Also listed in 
the Appendix are the sources of data on city characteristics, 
gathered from the decennial censuses, from 1890 to 1930. 
Missing data were estimated using regression to generate 
predicted values (Maddala, 1977). Only in one case, the per-
centage of illiterates in the population in the first time period, 
was estimation unreliable; the variable was excluded from the 
analysis in that period. 
Unfortunately, the definitions of some of the independent 
variables changed over time and were noncomparable. This 
problem is frequently encountered in the use of early census 
data. As a consequence, pooling of the data is not possible. 
When these data are treated as comparable, serious estimation 
errors undoubtedly occur, since some central measures, such 
as the basic definition of manufacturing industries, changed 
dramatically during the fifty-year period. While a single analysis 
can be used if the changed definitions are entered as new 
variables, interpretation is problematic. Therefore, four sepa-
rate successive analyses of the adoption of municipal civil 
service reform were conducted (see Williamson, and Swanson, 
1966, for a similar resolution of the problem). 
In the first analysis, the effects of the independent variables, as 
measured in the 1890 Census, on the transition rates for cities 
adopting civil service measures between 1885 and 1904 were 
examined. During this timespan only a small proportion of cities 
(about 11 percent) formally contracted with a commission or 
board to set standardized personnel requirements for municipal 
employees. Similarly, in the second analysis, the effects of city 
characteristics (measured ten years later) on the rate of adop-
tion between 1905 and 1914 were again examined; cities 
adopting the measure in the previous period were excluded 
from the analysis. This procedure was repeated for the third 
and fourth analyses, of rates of adoption between 1915 and 
1924, and between 1925 and 1934. In each analysis, city 
characteristics as measured in the decade just preceding the 
adoption period were used as predictors. Our objective, then, 
was to assess the continued effectiveness of these charac-
teristics in predicting the rate of adoption over time. 
Findings 
The results of the analyses are presented in Table 2. For each 
independent variable, the top row shows the parameter esti-
mates, the second row the standard errors of the coefficients, 
and the third row the exponential raised to the power of the 
coefficient. This last row indicates the proportion of change in 
the adoption rate induced by a change of the predictor variable 
by one unit. When a variable has no effect, this value is 1.0. A 
value greater than unity indicates a positive effect; less than 
unity indicates a negative effect. For example, 1.1 indicates a 10 
percent increase in the adoption rate, while .9 indicates a 10 
percent decrease per unit change. 
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Table 2 
Proportional Hazards Model of Civil Service Adoption over Time, 1885-1935 
Time 
period 
Percentage Manufacturing 
foreign- Percentage wage Municipal Log 
born illiterate earnerst expenditurest size Age -2 log 1 
Model 
chi-square 
Model 
D 
1885-1904 
[N = 83) 
1905-1914 
(W = 74) 
1915-1924 
(A/ = 52) 
1925-1934 
{N = 39) 
B 
SE 
exp(B) 
B 
SE 
exp(B) 
B 
SE 
exp(B) 
B 
SE 
exp (B) 
. 1 1 4 ' " 
.040 
1.120 
.056" 
.027 
1.058 
.029 
.030 
1.029 
.021 
.040 
1.020 
* 
-.069 
.079 
.933 
- . 2 7 9 " 
.127 
.757 
-.006 
.171 
.994 
- . 4 0 6 * " 
.888 
.666 
-.070 
.550 
.932 
.569 
.863 
1.766 
-.296 
.742 
.744 
-1,657 
.910 
.191 
.034 
.661 
1.035 
.299 
1.267 
1.349 
-1.361 
1.734 
.256 
.487* 
.326 
1.627 
.383* 
.249 
1.467 
.325 
.428 
1.384 
-.766 
.651 
.465 
.009 
.016 
1.009 
.0001 
.008 
1.000 
.016 
.013 
1.016 
-.010 
.016 
.990 
63.27 
175.67 
104.07 
57.25 
15.52 
(p < .008) 
15.77 
(p < .02) 
10.38 
(p < .11) 
2.04 
(p < .50) 
.51 
.35 
.35 
.17 
• p < . 0 1 ; " p < . 0 5 ; * " p < . 1 0 
•Excessive missing data; no reliable estimate possible. 
tResidualized on city size. 
Some suggestive results were obtained 
using a continuous version of the depen-
dent variable (year of adoption) that 
showed an even more striking decrease 
over time in the proportion of variance 
explained after correction for sample size. 
For further information, contact Pamela S. 
Tolbert. 
However, we are less interested in the effects of specific 
variables than in the overall fit of the model containing the 
variables in combination, since historians generally identify 
these as a cluster and since they might be expected to interact 
wi th each other. Harrell (1979) has argued that the D statistic 
can be interpreted analogously as the more familiar/?2, but this 
interpretation is not widespread. Consequently, we focus on 
the chi-square statistic and its significance level; both statistics, 
however, lead to the same conclusion. 
The data provide strong support for our predictions. In the first 
period, the overall model chi-square is significant beyond the 
.01 level (p < .008). In the second period, the effects appear to 
be weaker, as the overall significance level is lower and fewer 
of the independent variables have significant coefficients. The 
predictive power of the variables as a group continues to 
weaken through the third period and drops very sharply in the 
fourth period. The initial good explanation and the steep decline 
in explanatory power in the last time period are consistent wi th 
our expectations. As the process of adoption continues, the 
characteristics of cities become increasingly less relevant to the 
adoption process.6 
It is clear from the effects of the individual city variables 
reported in Table 2 that the decision to adopt in the early time 
periods was based to a significant degree on those characteris-
tics historians have described as important predictors of adop-
tion of civil service procedures, those related to reducing 
conflict and to streamlining the internal functioning of city 
government. In both the first and second time periods, the 
percentage of foreign-born and city size exerted significant 
influence on the adoption process in the expected direction. 
Also as predicted, in the first t ime period middle-class cities 
(those with a smaller proportion of blue-collar workers), were 
more likely to adopt the reform. However, as the process of 
adoption continued, the characteristics of cities were less 
frequently significant predictors of adoption. Only one variable, 
the percentage of illiterates, emerged as significant in the third 
time period; no variables were significant in the last time period. 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of City Characteristics over 
Percentage 
Time foreign-
period born 
1885-1904 
(A/ = 83) ( 
1905-1914 
(N = 74) ( 
1915-1924 
(W = 52) ( 
1925-1934 
(N = 39) ( 
•Standard devia 
tResidualizedor 
• Missing data. 
2172 
1173) 
1767 
1066) 
1577 
1192) 
1332 
1216) 
Percentage 
illiterate 
* 
6.9025 
(4.8043) 
5.4500 
(3.2914) 
4.8809 
(2.7061) 
tions in parentheses. 
I city size. 
Manufacturing 
wage 
earnerst 
-.0075 
(.4487) 
-.0096 
(.4614) 
.0399 
(.5637) 
-.0288 
(.6031) 
Time, 1885-1935* 
Municipal 
expenditurest 
-.0000 
(.3818) 
-.0116 
(.3968) 
-.0653 
(.3165) 
-.0417 
(.3085) 
Log 
size 
3.8581 
(1.072) 
3.9973 
(1.1049) 
4.1660 
(.9712) 
4.5989 
(.6721) 
Age 
1849.88 
(29.1994) 
1849.71 
(30.4510) 
1850.19 
(31.4503) 
1847.76 
(33.1720) 
Proportion 
adopting 
.0968 
(.2973) 
.2976 
(.4600) 
.2881 
(.4568) 
.1905 
(.3974) 
A major competing interpretation of the results can be elimi-
nated by examining the changes in variance overtime in city 
characteristics. It is clear from Table 3 that the variance does 
not decrease systematically over time. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our hypotheses concerning the changing sources of formal 
structure received considerable support in all analyses carried 
out here. Civil service procedures were adopted much more 
rapidly by cities when the state mandated them and the 
process of adoption was directed by a single source. In contrast, 
when no state-level legitimation occurred, civil service proce-
dures were adopted gradually, diffusing largely through social 
influence among cities. Most important for organizational 
theory, however, are the findings that internal organizational 
factors predicted adoption of civil service procedures at the 
beginning of the diffusion process, but did not predict adoption 
once the process was well underway. As an increasing number 
of organizations adopt a program or policy, it becomes progres-
sively institutionalized, or widely understood to be a necessary 
component of rationalized organizational structure. The legiti-
macy of the procedures themselves serves as the impetus for 
the later adopters. These findings permit a partial integration of 
the generally conflicting approaches focusing on the internal or 
the institutional sources of formal structure. In addition, they 
reassert the critical role of history for understanding organiza-
tional structure and its change (Stinchcombe, 1965; Meyerand 
Brown, 1977). 
The results reported here also have implications for two major 
areas of research that we did not directly address. First, 
treatment of the spread of innovation in a general theoretical 
framework permits the researcher both to gain more insights 
into the processes at work and to obtain more precise specifica-
tion of expected differences in patterns, rates, and correlates of 
diffusion. The ad hoc quality of most diffusion studies (e.g., 
Brown and Philliber, 1977) has made cumulative development 
nearly impossible except when the substantive diffusion is 
exactly the same, like the diffusion of hybrid corn, as discussed 
by Feller (1967). In contrast, we expect that our model can be 
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applied to a wide range of phenomena. For example, when 
diffusion patterns are suddenly truncated early in the process, 
we expect that there was a failure to legitimate the change and 
the characteristics that initially predicted adoption will remain 
good predictors throughout the process. In fact, this may well 
explain the pattern of the diffusion of some innovations in 
education, though the available data are not sufficient fora test 
(Rowan, 1982). 
Second, the results have implications for methodology. The 
use of cross-sectional data and the measurement of city 
characteristics wi th available data, not from the historical period 
under investigation, has been customary in research on the 
adoption of municipal reforms by city governments (cf., Sher-
benou, 1961; Kessel, 1962; Schnoreand Alford, 1963; Wol-
fingerand Field, 1966; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967). The results 
reported here should make it clear that such methodological 
shortcomings may introduce serious biases into the data: (1) 
these studies of municipal reform neglect the fact that con-
temporary data may not accurately reflect the city's standing on 
various characteristics at the time the reform was actually 
adopted and, thus, it is difficult to be certain whether present-
day differences between " re formed" and "unreformed" cities 
are causally or consequentially related to the adoption of the 
reforms, and (2) these studies, by relying on cross-sectional 
designs, ignore the fact that adoption of reforms by cities 
occurred over time and that factors influencing adoption may 
have varied from one point in time to the next. A city charac-
teristic important in predicting early adoption may be irrelevant 
twenty years later. 
Thus, the approach and results presented here have implica-
tions, both theoretical and methodological, for studies of 
change in the formal structure of organizations, for studies of 
innovation and diffusion, and for studies of adoption of reforms 
by municipal governments. But, most significant in terms of the 
goals of our research, the boundaries between the rational and 
the institutional approaches to organizations have been more 
clearly specified and the central role of history in understanding 
organizations confirmed. An adoption process rooted in the 
internal needs of the organization can become over time a 
process rooted in conformity to institutional definition. 
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